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AGO D/A ltr 29 Apr 1980

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| AUTHORITY  |              |
| 31 JUL 1978, DoDD 5200.10 gp-4; 31 Jul 1978,<br>DoDI 5230.24   |              |

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(18) OACSFOR (19) OT-RD-660142

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6 Lessons Learned, [6th BATTERY]  
[6TH HOWITZER BATTALION (155MM) (TOWED)] [16th ARTILLERY]  
1ST CAVALRY DIVISION (AIRMOBILE) [u] 8  
APO US Forces 96490

9 Operational rept. for quarterly period ending 31 Jul 66. (11) 27 July 66

SUBJECT: Initial command Report (RCS-CSGPO-RI) for period 14 April to 31 July 1966.

TO: Commanding Officer  
1st Air Cavalry Division Artillery  
APO US Forces 96490

(11) 1 Nov 66

(12) 13p.

APR 26 1968

SECTION I COMMANDER'S NARRATIVE

1. GENERAL.

a. Personnel: Btry C, 6th How Bn 16th Arty was alerted for deployment to Southeast Asia on 14 April 1966. There were two (2) officers and thirty six (36) enlisted men assigned to the battery on that date. Of this quantity, one (1) officer and twenty six (26) enlisted men were deployable. The battery roster was screened to determine by what grade and MOS people were required to bring the battery to full strength. 18 April thru 25 April 66 was utilized as a personnel filler period, however the battery was only eighty five (85) percent manned on 25 April and had completed one (1) week of its training program.

b. Training:

(1) The training program was to be conducted over a three (3) week period, 18 April thru 6 May 66, and the entire program was completed. It was a compact and aggressive training schedule which included the important facets of artillery required for deployment of the battery and included the following.

- a. Howitzer Section Drills
- b. Maintenance (Howitzer and Motor Vehicle)
- c. Motor March
- d. Clothing and Equipment Inspection
- e. Military Justice
- f. Jungle Survival
- g. Communications System of the 155 MM FA BN and Btry (Btry Level)
- h. Firing charts and data
- i. Battery RSOP (Non fire day and night)
- j. RVN training

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- (k) Service Practice
- (l) Ambush Training
- (m) Btry RSOP (live fire day and night)
- (n) M-60 MG firing
- (o) M-14 firing
- (p) M-79 firing
- (q) Gas Chamber
- (r) Maintenance of TOE equipment
- (s) Conducted three (3) day field training exercise.

(2) Training conducted aboard ship included as a minimum.

- (a) Personnel Counseling
- (b) V.D. Orientation
- (c) Your conduct in RVN
- (d) Observed fire procedures
- (e) Field Sanitation
- (f) Personnel Health in RVN
- (g) Maintenance and care of mosquito netting
- (h) Artillery Intelligence
- (i) First Aid
- (j) Care and maintenance of individual and crew served weapons

(3) Problem areas:

(a) Considering the material, practical exercises conducted, and the fluid personnel situation, the time frame available for training C Btry was exceptionally short.

(b) Because of the delay in manning the battery, organization and training were curtailed during the first week of operations. Other major items affecting the training program were:

- 1 The inability to obtain field equipment (TA 50-901),
- 2 The urgent requirement for processing for over-seas movement inspection which prevented use of the battery's TOE material. This necessitated utilization of equipment from other units which was also in use and in short supply.

### 2. PREPARATION FOR MOVE.

a. Supply: The battalion S-4 reviewed the equipment shortages and increased material needs of the battery. Requisitions and repair requests were initiated for all applicable items.

(1) Prescribed Load List were computed and requisitioned.

(2) The fill rate for maintenance and supply was 99% complete prior to the unit move.

(3) The S-4 acted as unit movement officer in addition to assisting in the establishment of the battery property book. This decision by the Battalion Commander was of great assistance to the battery.

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- (4) All battery TOE items were finally processed for shipment on 5 and 6 May 66.
- (5) On-loading of equipment was accomplished on 9 May 66.
- (6) Battery personnel departed on leave from 10 May thru 23 May 1966.
- (7) 24 May thru 29 May, the battery prepared for its in-ranks inspection and packed the remaining personnel equipment and yellow TAT items for deployment.

### 3. MOVEMENT:

a. There were no particular problems encountered during the movement from 30 May thru 17 June 1966. The unit departed Fort Sill, Oklahoma 300830 May 1966 by bus to Oklahoma City, Oklahoma. 301030 they displaced by air for Seattle International Airport arriving at 301215 (PCT) May 1966. They displaced from Seattle International Airport 301300 May 1966 and arrived at Tacoma Dock Side 301400 May 1966. The unit boarded the USNS Gen N.M. Walker at 302130 May 1966. The ship departed Tacoma dockside 10600 June 1 1966 and arrived in Qui Nhon RVN 161515 June 1966. C Btry 6th How Bn 16th Arty stepped ashore at Qui Nhon RVN 170930 June 1966, displaced to AN-KHE by air 171030 June 1966.

#### (1) Problem Areas:

- (a) Excessive hand carried baggage and lack of training space on board ship were the only adverse conditions encountered.
- (b) The ships cargo manifest listed us as having three (3) pieces of Red TAT equipment in general cargo in the hold of the ship. This was inaccurate as twenty-one (21) pieces were loaded. We had to personally check the hold to insure off loading of all of our Red TAT equipment.

### 4. ACTIVITIES IN COUNTRY

#### (a) Battery Area

(1) Upon arrival at An Khe, we erected tents in our designated area and proceeded immediately to construct a base camp site. Since our equipment and vehicles had not arrived, we were at a disadvantage regarding transportation, hand tools, electricity and communication, however, we did have the available man power to immediately begin work on our base camp installations.

(2) By borrowing hand tools from organizations on post, the battery was able to complete construction of the following structures between 20 June and 14 July 1966.

- (a) One (1) Orderly Room tent
- (b) One (1) Supply tent
- (c) One (1) Kitchen tent \*
- (d) One (1) Dining tent \*



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- (e) Twelve (12) Troop tents
  - (f) One (1) FDC Bunker \*
  - (g) Six (6) Gun parapets
  - (h) Two (2) Latrines (only 1 completed by 31 July 66)\*  
\* denotes structures with concrete floors, all other remaining structures have wooden floors.
  - (i) Approximately 63,000 sand bags were hand filled by battery personnel.
  - (j) Thirty five (35) 5 ton truck loads (equivalent) of sand and forty seven (47) 5 ton truck loads (equivalent) of dirt and rock fill were handled by the battery. Approximately 29,850 man hours were required to complete the battery working and living area and night work until 2400 hrs was required eight (8) times during this period.
- (3) Construction of the installations could have been expedited if engineer equipment would have been available to prepare the sites and trucks would have been available to handle the sand, rock, and dirt fill. The utilization of hand labor for these tasks extended construction time by at least ten (10) days, however, it did serve the purpose of improving the physical condition of the men and acclimating them to the heat and humidity here in Vietnam.
- (4) Excellent cooperation was received from Division Artillery and the host unit 2d How Bn (ABN) 19th Arty. Post facilities were utilized to provide tentage and sleeping equipment for the unit. Major emphasis has been placed on providing:
- (a) Gun emplacements
  - (b) Health and welfare items
  - (c) Living quarters
  - (d) Latrines
  - (e) Mess facilities

(5) Personnel and Administration: Only minor problems were encountered during personnel processing and all discrepancies were rectified satisfactorily.

### SECTION II COMMANDER'S ESTIMATE

1. GENERAL. The most critical problem encountered during the reporting period was time. There were only six (6) weeks between notification of alert and shipment day. The battery was less than 25% combat strength and with the influx of such a large number of filler personnel the task of molding a combat ready organization in such a short period of time was extremely difficult. The mission was accomplished. The mission was accomplished.

a. The Fire Direction section, because of inexperienced personnel, is weak. The section has worked hard but experience in depth is a critical shortcoming.

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### 4 ACTIVITIES IN COUNTRY (Cont)

#### b. Operations and Training

(1) The howitzers arrived from Qui Nhon at 211845 July 66 and were immediately positioned in the parapets in a ready to fire configuration. A registration was conducted 221530 July 66 and H&I fires were conducted 221800 July 66. Since that date, H&I activity has been as follows:

##### (a) Missions

|       | H&I | Reg | TOT | Adj | Total |
|-------|-----|-----|-----|-----|-------|
| 155MM | 316 | 4   | 2   | 1   | 323   |

##### (b) Fuze Utilization

|       | PD  | Time | CVT | Total |
|-------|-----|------|-----|-------|
| 155MM | 959 | 6    | 44  | 1009  |

##### (c) Projectile

|       | HE  | SMK | WP | Total |
|-------|-----|-----|----|-------|
| 155MM | 999 | 6   | 4  | 1009  |

##### (d) Aircraft Utilization OH-13

1 mission 1 sortie 1 hour

1 mission 5 sorties 1 hour 40 minutes

(e) Operation Steel Horse VII was conducted 25 July 1966. The battery fired on seventy (70) H&I concentrations and expended two hundred eighty one (281) rounds. Ninety five (95) men of C Btry participated in the operation.

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### b. Clothing and Equipment:

(1) During the time the battery was on leave (approximately ten (10) days) the Red TAT material was shipped to port. Battery personnel were not available to ship their equipment as prescribed by AR 220-10 therefore the men had to hand carry their entire issue of equipment and clothing during deployment. The airline was concerned regarding the bulk and weight hand carried aboard the aircraft. Quarters were cramped aboard ship and the excessive baggage added to the possibility of loss or destruction of equipment and clothing. The unit should have its in-ranks inspection and make certain that its Red TAT material is shipped prior to its personnel departing for leave.

(2) We believe the Red TAT material should include the following items:

- a Generator and Light Set
- b Communications Equipment to include telephones, wire and switchboard.
- c Lanterns (Gasoline and or battery) all available in the unit.
- d Water cans
- e Gasoline cans
- f Bag, Water, Sterilizing (maximum number available)
- g Tentage for troop quarters, Orderly Room, Supply Room, Command Post.
- h All pioneer tools in the unit
- i Carpenter set
- j All types of construction and building tools.
- k Chain Saws
- l Large cross-cut saw
- m Nails (Various sizes)
- n Refrigerators
- o Freezers
- p Kitchen tents
- q All Mess equipment

(3) Without the above listed items, we believe progress in establishing an area in the base camp would be extremely difficult and the likelihood of receiving the items from CONUS after arrival in country is highly remote.

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### 2. PERSONNEL

a. Personnel lessons have not been filled and are required for the following vacancies which at this time create hardship under our 24 hour a day alert schedule.

1-enlisted E-3

1-enlisted E-4

1-enlisted E-5

2-enlisted E-6

b. The following is the projected ETS losses for the next ninety (90) days in Vietnam:

|           | <u>Officers</u> | <u>Enlisted</u> |
|-----------|-----------------|-----------------|
| August    | 0               | 0               |
| September | 1               | 2               |
| October   | 0               | 0               |

### 3. OPERATIONS AND TRAINING

a. POR training goals were attained. However, the experience level and turn-over of personnel reduced the overall training level.

#### SECTION III COMMANDER'S RECOMMENDATIONS

1. A minimum of ninety (90) day notice should be provided:
  - a When the unit is less than thirty (30) per-cent manned.
  - b To provide completion of personnel transfers and filler action
  - c To insure adequate individuals and small unit training to be accomplished before deployment date.
  - d To make certain the individual and the unit receives the proper clothing and equipment prior to departure from CONUS.
2. A mission statement and a geographical location should be provided the unit a minimum of thirty (30) days prior to its time to depart.
3. Regardless of the time frame all units should be outloaded in a combat configuration if possible.
4. Movement orders should be issued far enough in advance to permit individuals to relocate and settle personal affairs.

/s/ Joseph L. Ecoppi

JOSEPH L. ECOPPI  
MAJ. Arty  
Commanding

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AVCDAR T (27 July 66) 1st Ind  
SUBJECT: Initial Command Report for Period 14 April to 31 July 1966  
(RCS: GSGPO - R1)

HEADQUARTERS, 1ST AIR CAVALRY DIVISION ARTILLERY, APO US Forces 96490  
3 August 1966


THRU: Commanding General, 1st Air Cavalry Division, ATTN: G3, APO US  
Forces 96490

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the  
Army, Washington, D.C. 20310

1. The attached report is forwarded in accordance with AR 1-19  
and USARV Regulation 870-2.

2. The report is considered to be a complete and accurate portrayal  
of the unit's preparation for movement to this command. The Commander's  
estimate and recommendations are considered to be the basic elements of  
a goal which should be adhered to whenever possible. It is realized, how-  
ever, that tactical and other considerations will frequently preclude com-  
plete observance of these goals for movement of units.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

  
JAMES F. CULP  
Major, Artillery  
Adjutant

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AVCDOT-T (27 July 1966) 2nd Ind  
SUBJECT: Initial Command Report for Period 14 April to 31 July 1966  
(RCS: GSGPO - R1)

HEADQUARTERS 1ST AIR CAVALRY DIVISION, APO 96490, 19 AUG 1966

TO: Commanding General, I Field Force Vietnam, APO 96240

Forwarded.

FOR THE COMMANDER:



DANIEL B. PLYLER  
LTC. AGC  
Adjutant General

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AVFA-GC-TMG

SUBJECT: Initial Operational Report for Period 14 April to 31 July 66, RCS  
CSFOR-65 (U)

3d Ind


Headquarters, I Field Force Vietnam, APO US Forces 96240 21 AUG 1966

TO: Commanding General, United States Army Vietnam, APO US Forces 96307

Concur with comments and recommendations in basic report and 1st indorsement.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

1 Incl  
no

  
ROBERT A. DICKOVER  
Captain, AGC  
Asst Adjutant General

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AVHGC-DH 4th Ind  
SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned for Period Ending 31 July  
1966 (RCS CSFOR-65)

HEADQUARTERS, UNITED STATES ARMY, VIETNAM, APO San Francisco 96307

TO: Commander-in-Chief, United States Army, Pacific, ATTN: GPOF-MH  
APO 96558

06 OCT '66

1. (U) The Operational Report-Lessons Learned submitted by Battery C, 6th Howitzer Battalion, 16th Artillery for the quarter ending 31 July 1966 is forwarded herewith.

2. (U) Concur with the basic report and the indorsements as modified by the statements contained in the succeeding paragraphs.

3. (C) Reference Paragraph 1, Section II:

a. The Commander states in Paragraph 1a, Section I that his unit was alerted for deployment to South East Asia on 14 April 1966. The Department of the Army (DA) list, Subject: Deployment Status of Army Units (DEPSTAR), shows the date of the DA Warning Order to this unit was 29 March 1966.

4. (C) Reference Paragraph 1b(2), Section II:

a. Paragraph 21, AR 220-10, Preparation for Overseas Movement of Units (POM), lists Minimum Essential Equipment (MEE), which normally accompanies troops on overseas movements. This list contains about one third of the items which the Commander of Battery C, 6th Howitzer Battalion, 16th Artillery, recommended as additional required Red TAT items.

b. A Red TAT list for one battery size unit will not apply to all units of the same size deploying to Vietnam. The sponsor unit recommends to the deploying unit items which should be added to or deleted from the published Red TAT list. The sponsor unit has first-hand knowledge of the availability of supplies and equipment.

5. (C) Reference Paragraph 2, Section III:

a. AR 220-10 states that Warning Orders and Movement Directives will give unit destinations and assignment data.

Group 4

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AVHGC-DH

4th Ind

SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned for Period Ending 31 July 1966 (RCS CSFOR-65)

b. Copies of many sponsor-to-unit letters received by this headquarters show that many sponsors provide information on unit mission and location, and even elaborate details on the overall environment.

c. CONFIDENTIAL LETTER OF INSTRUCTION NUMBER 6, Headquarters USARV, Subject: Reception and Processing of In-Coming Units (U), 14 March 1966, with Change 1, 8 June 1966, outlines responsibilities for designated sponsors of in-coming units. This Letter of Instruction will be amended to require sponsors to provide maximum information to units regarding location and environment. The gaining parent unit will be required to provide available information concerning the unit's mission.

FOR THE COMMANDER:



R. J. THORNTON  
1st Lt, AGC  
Asst Adjutant General

1 Incl  
as

*Group 4*

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DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS  
DOD EIR 5100.10

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GPOP-OT(27 Jul 66)

5th Ind(U)

SUBJECT: Initial Command Report (RCS-GSGPO-RI) for Period 14 April  
to 31 July 1966

HQ, US ARMY, PACIFIC, APO San Francisco 96558 1 NOV 1966

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the  
Army, Washington, D. C. 20310

This headquarters concurs in the basic report as indorsed.

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:



D. A. HARRISON  
Capt, AGC  
Asst AG

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INCLOSURE(S) 4th indorsement.

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